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INTRODUCTION 
The trial court expressed confusion in its application of the trial facts to the law under 
the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence. See Memorandum Decision dated April 7,2004 
(copy attached as Addendum "A," and referred to hereafter as the "Memorandum Decision") 
("The law surrounding the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence is confusing." 
Memorandum Decision at 2). In fact, the trial court noted the competing interests between 
settling boundary disputes by recorded instruments on the one hand, and allowing the peace 
and good order of society to be served by judicially recognizing boundaries accepted over 
a long period of time, on the other; as if these competing interests were still in question in 
the State of Utah. See Memorandum Decision at 2-3. Utah courts have balanced these 
competing interests, and determined that the latter interests outweigh the former; it is no 
longer subject to debate. It is respectfully suggested that the trial court misunderstood the 
applicable law with respect to the element of mutual acquiescence under the doctrine of 
boundary by acquiescence, and made erroneous inferences which are inconsistent with the 
facts. 
ARGUMENT 
I. Elements of Boundary by Acquiescence. 
In its Memorandum Decision, the trial court found that three of the four elements of 
the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence had been met. Specifically, the court found: 
1 
A. Occupation up to a visible line marked by monuments, fences, or 
buildings. 
Near the North border of the Jorgensen parcel is a fence which runs along what 
is now the disputed boundary in a southeasterly direction, roughly along the 
Southern border of the Brown parcel. 
Memorandum Decision at 4, Finding of Fact No. 2. 
The fence has been observable since its construction.. .[and] the court, based 
on several other witnesses testimony, finds the fence has remained observable 
and open since the mid 1940s. 
Memorandum Decision at 4, Finding of Fact No. 3. 
Below that fence plaintiff and his family have used the property to graze cattle 
and sheep. There is an irrigation ditch that plaintiff has maintained and 
improved which is below, on the downhill side of, the fence. Plaintiff has also 
caused some of that ditch to be covered by constructing culverts. 
Memorandum Decision at 5, Finding of Fact No. 6. 
Defendant bought 195 acres in 1979 as an investment. He inspected the 
property and observed fence posts but the court finds the fence was visible. 
Memorandum Decision at 6, Finding of Fact No. 8. 
Defendant took surveyors and potential buyers along that area of the ditch 
[below the fence] but the court finds that was not occupation of the land. 
Memorandum Decision at 6, Finding of Fact No. 10. 
B. For a long period of time. 
This element was established by partial summary judgment by Judge Robert K. Hilder 
on April 6, 2002. See Memorandum Decision at 1-2. 
The trial court also specifically found that this element was met: 
The fence was built by the father of plaintiff Thomas Brown, T. Edward 
Brown, in the mid 1940s, between 1943 and 1946 [and] the fence has 
remained in the same basic position since that time . . . . 
Memorandum Decision at 4, Finding of Fact No. 3. 
2 
In 1979 Jorgensen and a partner, Rowell, acquired the Jorgensen parcel 
Memorandum Decision at 4-5, Finding of Fact No. 4; Jorgensen obtained 
legal title to an interest in the Jorgensen parcel on April 1, 1979, see Exhibit 
18, the relevant portion of which is attached hereto as Addendum "B". 
On or about July 1,1999, defendant wrote a note to plaintiffs telling them that 
they had built a fence on defendant's land and it should be removed. 
Memorandum Decision at 6, Finding of Fact No. 7. 
C. By adjoining landowners 
This element was also established by partial summary judgment issued by Judge 
Robert K. Hilder on April 6,2002. See Memorandum Decision at 1-2. Additionally, the trial 
court found that "Plaintiffs own land adjacent to defendant's land in Summit County." 
Memorandum Decision at 4, Finding of Fact No. 1. 
D. Mutual acquiescence in the line as a boundary. 
As more particularly discussed below, the trial court made factual findings on this 
issue that support a conclusion that the element is established, such as the Plaintiffs 
maintained and improved the property on their side of the fence and both parties and their 
predecessors had always occupied up to but not beyond the fence without objection. See 
Memorandum Decision at 5-6, Finding of Fact Nos. 5, 6, and 7. However the trial court 
inferred as a matter of law that mutual acquiescence had not occurred. See Memorandum 
Decision at 8-9, Conclusion of Law Nos. 5, 6 and 7. It is the trial court's legal conclusions 
regarding mutual acquiescence that Appellants will address in this Reply Memorandum. 
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II. Marshaling of the Evidence. 
In his brief, Appellee correctly notes that to challenge a trial court's findings of fact, 
an appellant must marshal the evidence in support of the trial court's findings of fact, and 
then identify a fatal flaw in the evidence sufficient to convince the appellate court that the 
trial court's findings of fact are clearly erroneous. See A WINC Corp. v. Simonsen, 112 P.3d 
1228,1230 (Utah App. 2005). In the absence of such marshaling of evidence, the appellate 
court is to assume that the record supports the findings of the trial court and proceeds to a 
review of the accuracy of the lower court's conclusions of law and the application of that law 
in the particular case. See id. Appellants maintain that the evidentiary findings of the trial 
court do not support it's legal conclusions regarding the element of mutual acquiescence. 
Aside from the trial court's rather loose usage of the term "survey" in its findings of 
fact, the Appellants do not object to the court's findings of fact as listed in its Memorandum 
Decision. Appellants do note, however, that the 1971 "survey" referenced in the trial court's 
Finding of Fact No. 5 (Memorandum Decision at 5) was not technically a survey, but was 
rather a plot drawing to enable the Plaintiffs to construct a home on their property. See T. 
at 111-12 and Exhibit 6. Additionally, the 1994 "survey" commissioned by Defendant as 
referenced in the trial court's Finding of Fact Nos. 7 and 11 (Memorandum Decision at 6-7), 
was also not technically a survey, but rather was a diagram drawn by Wally France. See T. 
at 102-03. The 1994 drawing by Wally France showed the boundary line running through 
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Plaintiffs' residential home, which the trial court acknowledged was incorrect. See 
Memorandum Decision at 6-7, Finding of Fact Nos. 7 and 11. 
In fact, neither Plaintiffs nor Defendant commissioned an actual land survey of their 
boundary line until after the dispute arose in July of 1999. See Exhibits 7, 9 and 10. 
Therefore, prior to 1999, neither the Plaintiffs nor the Defendant knew with certainty the 
exact location of the boundary line between their respective parcels. Significantly, no survey, 
plot plan, diagram or land inspection by surveyors was conducted prior to 1999 for the 
purpose of determining whether the subject fence was the common boundary between the 
parties. The definitive surveys, conducted after July 1999, show that the record boundary 
line lies below the fence; however no objective certainty was reached as to the actual 
boundary line until after the dispute arose in 1999. See Exhibits 7, 9 and 10. 
III. Mutual Acquiescence Was Established at Trial. 
A. Standard of Review 
The issue of whether the trial court correctly concluded that the parties did not 
acquiesce in the fence as a boundary, is reviewable as a matter of law. Wilkenson Family 
Farm LLC v. Babcock, 993 P.2d 229, 230 (Utah App. 1999). 
B. Elements of Mutual Acquiescence 
The elements of mutual acquiescence have been articulated by the Utah Supreme 
Court using varying terminology. At times, the standard is expressed as a showing that "both 
parties recognized and acknowledged a visible line, such as a fence or building, as the 
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boundary of the adjacent parcels." Ault v. Holden, 44 P.3d 781,788 (Utah 2002) (emphasis 
added). More recently, inRHNCorp. v. Veibell, 96P.3d935,1f31 (Utah 2004) the Supreme 
Court favorably cited a case using a slightly different standard: "[W]here owners of adjacent 
parcels of land have occupied, adversely to each other for more than [the required period of 
time], their respective tracks by a division line, which each has recognized and acquiesced 
in as the true boundary line, during all of that time, either is estopped from afterwards 
questioning it as the true line." Id., quoting Rydalch v. Anderson, 107 P. 25, 30 (1910) 
(emphasis added). 
The distinction is important because of the varying meanings of the words employed. 
The word "acknowledge" is defined as: "To own, avow, or admit; to confess; to recognize 
one's acts, and assume the responsibility therefor." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 21 (5th ed. 
1979). In other words, the term "acknowledge" denotes some overt act or express agreement 
on the part of the property owner to admit or confess that the fence is the boundary line. 
By contrast, the term "acquiesce" is defined as: "To give an implied consent to a 
transaction, to the accrual of a right, or to any act, by one's mere silence, or without express 
assent or acknowledgment." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 22 (5th ed. 1979). In contrast to 
an acknowledgment, an acquiescence is by definition without acknowledgment, and may be 
done by silence. After all, the legal doctrine is known as "Boundary by Acquiescence," not 
"Boundary by Acknowledgment" or "Boundary by Agreement." This is a significant 
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principle that Plaintiff argued at trial and that was upheld by the Utah Supreme Court in RHN 
Corp. v. Veibell, 96 P.3d 935, p i (Utah 2004). 
The trial court required that the Plaintiffs show that both parties recognized and 
acknowledged the fence as the boundary line. "To show mutual acquiescence, plaintiffs must 
show both parties recognized and acknowledged a visible line and that the parties 
acknowledge the line as a demarcation between the properties." Memorandum Decision at 
3. In the court's application of the law to the facts of this case, it uses the term 
"acknowledge" repeatedly throughout its Conclusions of Law. See, e.g., Memorandum 
Decision at 9-10, Conclusion of Law No. 6, where the trial court uses the term 
"acknowledge," or a variant thereof, nine separate times. 
It appears that, in some instances, the courts have used the terms "acquiescence" and 
"acknowledgment" interchangeably. For example, the two principal cases cited in Ault v. 
Holden, 44 P.3d 781, 788 (Utah 2002) as support for the "recognized and acknowledged" 
standard expressly state the standard as requiring the parties to "recognize and acquiesce in" 
the boundary line. Florence v. Hiline Equip. Co., 581 P.2d 998, 1000 (Utah 1978) ("It is 
well established that if adjoining landowners occupy their respective premises up to a certain 
line which they mutually recognize and acquiesce in for a long period of time, the true 
boundary being unknown, they are precluded from claiming that the boundary line thus 
recognized and acquiesced in is not the true one." (Emphasis added). Fuoco v. Williams, 
All P.2d 944, 947 (1966) ("In order to establish a boundary by acquiescence, it is not 
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necessary that the acquiescence should be manifested by a conventional agreement, but 
recognition and acquiescence must be mutual, and both parties must have knowledge of the 
existence of a line as boundary line." (Emphasis added). 
Further, the Ault court added a quote from American Jurisprudence in support of the 
"recognized and acknowledged" standard as follows: "When adjoining landowners occupy 
their respective premises up to a certain line which they mutually recognize and acquiesce 
in for a long period of time,.. . they are precluded from claiming that the boundary line thus 
recognized and acquiesced in is not the true one." Ault v. Holden, 44 P.3d 781, 788 (Utah 
2002) quoting 12 AM. JUR. 2D Boundaries § 83 (1997) (emphasis in original). 
C. Origin of "Acknowledgment" Element 
The notion of requiring an overt acknowledgment of a fence as a boundary line in 
cases involving the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence appears to have its genesis in 
Wilkenson Family Farm LLC v. Babcock, 993 P.2d 229 (Utah App 1999). "Mutual 
acquiescence in a line as a boundary has two requirements: that both parties recognize the 
specific line, and that both parties acknowledge the line as the demarcation between the 
properties." Id. at 231 (emphasis added). In support of this proposition, the Wilkenson court 
cites Fuoco v. Williams, 421 P.2d 944, 947 (1966), which is cited above, and which stated 
the standard as "recognize and acquiesce in" the line. The Wilkenson court goes on to state: 
"Acquiescence does not require an explicit agreement, 'but recognition and acquiescence 
must be mutual, and both parties must have knowledge of the existence of a line as [the] 
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boundary line.'" Wilkenson at 231, quoting Wright v. Clissold, 521 P.2d 1224,1227 (Utah 
1974) (emphasis added). Even the Wilkenson court appears to use the terms "acquiescence" 
and "acknowledgment" interchangeably. 
The Wilkenson case contained facts that justified a more stringent acknowledgment 
standard for mutual acquiescence. In that case, Babcock5 s predecessors built a fence on their 
property to keep their cattle from wandering onto Wilkenson's property. The fence could not 
be located entirely on the boundary line (which was a section line) because of cliffs and 
gullies, so a portion of it was built on a slant. Both parties knew that the exclusive purpose 
of this "slant fence" was to keep cattle from wandering onto Wilkenson's property. 
Apparently, Wilkenson did not dispute the clear purpose of the fence, but rather argued that 
the purpose of the fence should not be considered by the court because the other elements of 
the boundary by acquiescence doctrine had been met. See Wilkenson at 230-31. 
The court declined to award Wilkenson the disputed property under the facts 
presented, and rather imposed a requirement that Wilkenson prove that Babcock had 
acknowledged the fence as a boundary line, as opposed to a cattle containment device. "In 
Holmes, the court carefully noted that owners could claim to the true property lines beyond 
the fence 'where it is clear that the [fence] as located was not intended as a boundary."' Id. 
at 231, quoting Holmes v. Judge, 87 P. 1009, 1014 (1906). 
In a later case, defendants in a boundary by acquiescence case attempted to argue that 
the court's holding in Wilkenson amounted to the elimination of indolence or silence as a 
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basis for establishing acquiescence. The defendants argued that because they had not 
expressly acknowledged the fence as a boundary line, mutual acquiescence could not be 
established under Wilkenson. See Mason v. Loveless, 24 P.3d 997, 1004 (Utah App 2001). 
The Mason court strongly rejected this notion stating: "Furthermore, our supreme court has 
acknowledged that '[acquiescence is more nearly synonymous with indolence, or consent 
by silence.' Lane v. Walker, 505 P.2d 1199, 1200 (1973). Thus, our settled case law is 
contrary to defendants' argument and clearly provides that acquiescence maybe established 
by silence.55 Id. Appellants respectfully submit that if an outright acknowledgment of a fence 
as a boundary line is always a required element of mutual acquiescence in the State of Utah, 
then boundary by acquiescence could never by established by silence. 
Finally, as recently as this year, this court has favorably cited the standard for mutual 
acquiescence to be that both parties recognize and acquiesce in the fence as a boundary line. 
"The trial court concluded, based on the undisputed facts presented by the parties, that' [t]he 
boundaries between the Griffiths Property [and] the Buttars[es] Property . . . have been 
clearly marked and identified, as they are now, by long established fence lines, which fence 
lines have been recognized and acquieseed in by the respective owners of the Griffiths 
Property [and] the Buttarsfes] Property... as the actual boundaries between their respective 
properties . . . ."' Massey v. Griffiths, 535 Utah Adv. Rep. 45, % 11 n.2 (Utah App. 2005) 
(emphasis added). 
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D. Reconciliation of Standard 
The logical reconciliation of these varying cases is that the standard for mutual 
acquiescence in Utah is that both parties must recognize and acquiesce in a fence as the 
boundary line, unless there is some clear evidence of an alternate purpose for the fence, as 
in Wilkenson. If there is clear evidence of a contrary purpose (other than as a boundary), then 
a plaintiff must show that the defendant actually acknowledged the fence as a boundary line. 
The "recognize and acquiesce" elements of mutual acquiescence are different than the 
standard applied by the trial court in this case. The trial court used a standard of "recognize 
and acknowledge," which is a higher burden than is required by Utah case law in a case of 
this nature. 
When the correct standard is applied to the case at bar, the outcome is quite different. 
The trial court specifically found that the fence was built in the 1940s by the Plaintiff, 
Thomas Brown, and his father (see Memorandum Decision at 4, Finding of Fact No. 3), and 
that the fence has remained in the same basic position since that time (id.) and that the fence 
has been observable since its construction. Id. Although Defendant Lee Jorgensen testified 
at trial contrary to this visibility, the trial court "based on several other witnesses testimony, 
finds the fence has remained observable and open since the mid-1940s. Several neighbors 
and friends and relatives of plaintiffs so testified and some had been in the area and recall 
the fence from the 1940s." Id. Based upon these findings, both parties clearly recognized the 
fence since its construction in the mid-1940s. 
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On the question of acquiescence, the court's factual findings also establish that the 
Defendant Lee Jorgensen acquiesced in the fence as a boundary line. Specifically, the court 
found that the Plaintiffs predecessor, T. Edward Brown, used his land to graze cattle and to 
grow hay and other crops after construction of the fence until his death in 1951. See 
Memorandum Decision at 5, Finding of Fact No. 5. Plaintiffs took possession of the Brown 
parcel in 1971 and continued to use that parcel, including the disputed property below the 
fence line, to graze cattle and sheep, and improve and maintain an irrigation ditch and 
constructing culverts on the ditch. See Memorandum Decision at 5, Finding of Fact Nos. 5 
and 6. The trial court also specifically found that neither Jorgensen nor his predecessors 
attempted to use or occupy the subject property below, or on the Brown side of, the fence. 
See Memorandum Decision at 5, Finding of Fact No. 6. The court found that after taking 
title to the Jorgensen parcel in 1979, that Jorgensen did nothing, by word or deed, to object 
to the visible fence until July 1, 1999, more than 20 years after Jorgensen took title to his 
property. See Memorandum Decision at 4 and 6, Finding of Fact Nos. 4 and 7. Based upon 
the clear findings of fact rendered by the court, the inescapable conclusion is that Jorgensen 
recognized and acquiesced in the fence as the boundary line, and title to the subject property 
should be vested in Plaintiffs. 
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E. Case Distinguished from Wilkenson 
To justify its conclusions, the trial court attempts to apply the analysis of Wilkenson 
to this case. However the facts of this case as found by the trial court are very different from 
the facts of the Wilkenson case: 
1. Construction of Fence. In Wilkenson, the defendant' s predecessor constructed 
the slant fence in a location other than the record boundary line in order to contain his cattle 
and prevent them from straying onto plaintiffs property. See Wilkenson at 230. By contrast, 
in this case, Plaintiff Thomas Brown and his father constructed the fence in a location they 
believed was the boundary line between their property and Jorgensen's predecessor's 
property. See Memorandum Decision at 5, Finding of Fact No. 5. In contrast to Wilkenson, 
rather than building on their own property, the Browns had to trespass (as to record title) to 
build the fence on ground belonging to Jorgensen's predecessor. 
2. Location of Fence. In Wilkenson, the fence was built on a slant from the 
boundary line because to build the fence on the boundary line was impractical due to cliffs 
and gullies. See Wilkenson at 230. By contrast, the Browns built their fence on the side of 
a hill in an area that is steeper than the relatively flat ground where the record property line 
is located. See Memorandum Decision at 5, Finding of Fact No. 6; see also Exhibits 1 and 
2. In other words, rather than building the Brown fence in a more convenient location as one 
would expect for a cattle containment fence, the Browns instead built their fence on a side 
hill where they thought the actual property line was located. 
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3. Known Purpose of Fence. In Wilkenson, both the plaintiff and the defendants 
acknowledged that the original purpose of the fence was cattle containment. See Wilkenson 
at 230. By contrast, in the present case, the court specifically found that the Browns always 
considered the fence to be the property line ever since the fence was built. See Memorandum 
Decision at 5, Finding of Fact No. 5. Therefore, while the trial court inferred that the 
purpose of the fence was for livestock containment, the sole testimony at trial, and the sole 
finding of the trial court on this issue, was that the Plaintiffs intended the fence to be a 
boundary when they constructed it in the 1940s. In short, the trial court's inference in this 
case that the fence's purpose was for livestock containment is directly contradicted by the 
trial court's factual findings. 
4. Reputation of Fence. In Wilkenson, the fence in question did not have a 
reputation in the community as being the boundary line between the parties' respective 
parcels. See Wilkenson at 230. In contrast, in this case, several neighbors testified that they 
understood the fence to be the boundary line between the Brown Parcel and the Jorgensen 
Parcel. This is alluded to by the trial court. See Memorandum Decision at 4, Finding of Fact 
No. 3. Specifically, Lloyd Marchant testified that the community recognized the fence as the 
boundary line between the two parcels. See T. at 42. Mr. Marchant further testified that he 
recognized the fence as the boundary line between the two parcels. See T. at 51. Reinhard 
Ruf testified that it was his understanding that the fence was the boundary line between the 
Brown Parcel and the Jorgensen Parcel. See T. at 54. Elden Stembridge also testified that 
14 
he considered the boundary of the property to be along the fence line. See T. at 86. In light 
of this evidence, the trial court's inference that the purpose of the fence was to contain 
livestock is clearly erroneous. 
IV. Trial Court's Conclusions of Law. 
To support its conclusion as a matter of law that there was no mutual acquiescence 
in this case, the trial court made four (4) questionable conclusions which are not supported 
by logic, reason, or the facts as found by the trial court. 
A. Purpose of Fence to Contain Livestock 
The trial court inferred that the purpose of the fence was to contain livestock. 
The topography and terrain made the fence placement a practical place to erect 
a fence as it would keep cattle and sheep off of the irrigation ditch and the 
lower drop off and off of what was in the 1940s pasture land, until the home 
was built in 1971. Given the slope and the irrigation ditch and the terrain in 
the area the court infers and concludes that the purpose of the fence was to 
contain livestock and keep grazing livestock of the predecessor owner from the 
Brown property. The fence was not intended as a boundary line demarcating 
the property. 
(Memorandum Decision at 8, Conclusions of Law No. 5). 
As noted above, this conclusion of law is directly contradicted by the trial court's 
factual finding that the builders of the fence, the Browns, considered the fence to be the 
boundary. See Memorandum Decision at 5, Finding of Fact No. 5. It is illogical to infer that 
the Browns would build a fence on their neighbor's parcel that would keep their neighbor's 
livestock from a water source that was also on their neighbor's parcel by record. Further, if 
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the purpose of the fence was to protect the irrigation ditch from livestock on the Jorgensen 
Parcel, why does the fence not run along the irrigation ditch instead of actually being located 
quite a distance from the ditch? See Exhibits 7 and 10. Why does the fence run along a 
hillside instead of the more level record property line? See Exhibits 1 and 2. The trial 
court's inference that the purpose of the fence was a livestock containment fence is based 
solely upon evidence that, from time to time during the nearly 60 year history since the 
construction of the fence, livestock were kept on one side or the other of the fence. 
However, in considering that fact, one must also consider the clear finding of the trial court 
that "[t]he fence was always considered by plaintiff to be the boundary line and plaintiff 
believed folly that the fence was the property line to his property and has believed that since 
the fence was built. . .." Memorandum Decision at 5, Finding of Fact No. 5. Clearly, the 
trial court's inference as to the purpose of the fence as merely for livestock containment is 
not supported by the evidence nor by logic and reason. 
B. 1994 Diagram 
The trial court also concluded as a matt er of law that Jorgensen's investigation in 1994 
of his property for development purposes manifested a lack of acquiescence of the fence as 
the property boundary line. See Memorandum Decision at 9, Conclusion of Law No. 6. 
The trial court erroneously concluded that the only reason to commission a survey 
(such as it was), was to resolve a boundary line dispute. This was certainly not the case. 
Surveys are routinely done in connection with real estate sale transactions and lending 
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transactions. Obviously, in those instances, the surveys are not commissioned because a 
property owner disputes one of its boundary lines. 
In this case, the 1994 diagram was not made to determine whether the fence was the 
true boundary, but rather to promote the sale of some of Jorgensen's land. The trial court 
specifically found that Jorgensen's 1994 diagram was done "in anticipation of possible 
buyers of some of his land." See Memorandum Decision at 6, Finding of Fact No. 11. 
Therefore, by the trial court's own factual finding, Jorgensen did not order the 1994 diagram 
in order to determine whether the fence was on the true boundary line; rather, Jorgensen 
ordered the 1994 diagram in connection with a plan to market his property. That act alone 
does not constitute non-acquiescence on the part of Jorgensen as to the fenceline boundary. 
Moreover, the 1994 diagram was irrelevant to the true boundary, because the fence had been 
established by operation of law as the monument of the boundary more than twenty years 
earlier because of the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence during Mr. Tracy's occupation. 
SeeRHNM] 31. 
C. Non-Communication to Adjacent Property Owner 
Next, the trial court concluded that a manifestation of non-acquiescence need not be 
communicated to the adjacent property owner in order to defeat a boundary by acquiescence 
claim. "Moreover, the court concludes [the 1994 diagram] need not have been conveyed to 
the opposing landowner to evidence a lack of acquiescence, or unwillingness to accept the 
fence as a boundary line." Memorandum Decision at 9, Conclusion of Law No. 6. This 
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position is in direct conflict with the Utah Supreme Court's holding that while an ouster or 
legal action is not required to prove non-acquiescence, "conversations in which a record 
owner unequivocally informs the other that he owns beyond the 'visible line' claimed as a 
boundary, and that the owner does not recognize that line as separating the properties, are 
conclusive that a party has not acquiesced in the line as the property line." See Ault v. 
Holden, 44 P.3d 781, 789 (Utah 2002). The trial court's contrary ruling fails to recognize 
the estoppel-related underpinnings of the boundary by acquiescence doctrine. Indeed the 
settled law in Utah clearly provides that "[acquiescence may also be shown by silence, or 
the failure of a party to object to a line as a boundary." See RHN at % 25. 
D. Jorgensen's Predecessor's Acquiescence 
Finally, the trial court failed to properly conclude that Jorgensen's predecessor, Tracy, 
acquiesced in the fence as a boundary line. Instead, the trial court concluded: "There may 
be an inference that Tracy, running livestock, saw the fence, but the court concludes that is 
insufficient to show Tracy even saw ('recognized') the fence, let alone acknowledged it as 
a boundary line." Memorandum Decision at 10, Conclusion of Law No. 6. In other words, 
the trial court again improperly applied the "recognized and acknowledged" standard to 
Jorgensen's predecessor, Tracy. 
Unlike Jorgensen, who was essentially an absentee landowner, Tracy actually ran 
livestock on the Jorgensen parcel after the fence was built. See Memorandum Decision at 
6, Finding of Fact No. 9. Several neighboring property owners testified that they saw the 
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fence over a long period of time going back to the 1940s. See Memorandum Decision at 4, 
Finding of Fact No. 3. Lloyd Marchant saw the fence (see T. at 42); Reinhard Ruf saw the 
fence (see T. at 54); Elden Stembridge saw the fence (see T. at 86); Orland Crandell saw the 
fence (see T. at 70); and Brian Andersen saw the fence (see T. at 65). While the trial court 
is apparently willing to make the ultimate inference that the Browns built the fence on the 
side of a hill on Tracy's record property, not as a boundary, but to protect Tracy's record 
property from Tracy's own livestock, yet it cannot make the inference that Tracy, who 
occupied the land and ran the livestock, saw the fence that contained his livestock. If an 
inference were to be made from the evidence, this is it: Tracy recognized and acquiesced in 
the fence as the common boundary with Brown. 
This court should make the inference that as an occupant running livestock on the 
property, Tracy recognized the fence after its construction in the 1940fs for a period of more 
than twenty years until the property was sold to Mr. Jorgensen in 1979. Thomas Brown 
testified at trial that Tracy Wright never objected to the fence after its construction in the 
1940fs. See T. at 109; see also Memorandum Decision at 5-6, Findings of Fact Nos. 6 and 
9. Tracy's recognition of the fence and acquiescence in it as the boundary line from the mid-
1940's through 1979 constitutes boundary by acquiescence, even before Jorgensen took title 
to the Jorgensen Parcel. "Once adjacent landowners have acquiesced in a boundary for a 
long period of time, the operation of the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence is not vitiated 
by a subsequent discovery of the true record boundary by one of the parties." RHN at f 31. 
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CONCLUSION 
The trial court was admittedly confused in its application of the applicable Utah law 
in this boundary by acquiescence case, and the inferences made by the trial court reflect a 
results-based decision that is not in harmony with Utah law. The trial court's evidentiary 
findings support a judgment in Appellant Browns' favor. When the proper elements of the 
doctrine of boundary by acquiescence are applied to the facts found by the trial court, the 
inescapable conclusion is that the Browns are entitled to an adjudication in their favor. The 
Appellants respectfully request that this Court apply the law to the facts as set forth above, 
and award legal title to the Appellants over the subject property which the Appellants and 
their predecessors have claimed and occupied for nearly sixty (60) years. 
DATED this 28th day of October, 2005. 
& HOGGAN, P.C. 
James C. Jenkins 
Robert B. Funk 




IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH 
THOMAS E. BROWN, JR. and 
MARILYN R. BROWN, 
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vs. 
LEE JORGENSEN; JOHN DOES 1-10, 
and other persons unknown claiming 
title or interest in the suD]ect 
property of this action, 
Defendant. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Case No. 010600152 
Judge BRUCE C. LUBECK 
DATE: April 7, 2004 
The above matter came before the court for a bench trial on 
March 31 and April 1, 2004. Plaintiffs were present with James C. 
Jenkins and Defendant was present with Ray G. Martmeau and David 
S. Cook. 
BACKGROUND 
The underlying law suit relates to a dispute over a boundary 
line. On May 30, 2001, plaintiffs Thomas E. Brown, Jr. and 
Marilyn R. Brown (Plaintiffs) filed a complaint seeking an order 
that they are the fee simple owners of certain land. They claim 
to be the sole owners because they have acquired the property 
under the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence. The issue is 
straight-forward. Defendant owns the disputed land by deed and 
all recorded instruments. Approximately 53 years ago, Thomas E. 
Brown, Jr.'s father erected a fence on Defendant's piedecbssor's 
property and plaintiff and his predecessors have been using the 
property since then under the belief that the fence was in fact 
the recorded property line. It was not, and so the issue is 
whether that use now amounts to acquiring the property under the 
doctrine of boundary by acquiescence 
On June 14, 2001, defendant answered and filed a 
counterclaim seeking to quiet title in the property. Defendant 
claims to be the record owner of the disputed property. 
The parties filed motions for summary judgment and partial 
summary judgment. On April 6, 2002, the court, Judge Robert K. 
Hilder, granted partial summary judgment in favor of Plaintiffs 
on the third and fourth prongs of the boundary by acquiescence 
standard. Specifically, the court concluded that as a matter of 
law the boundary was established for a long period of time, 
namely 53 years, and that there were adjoining properties. In the 
court's June 28, 2002 clarification the court stated that the 
remaining issues for trial are the first two prongs of the 
boundary by acquiescence standard, which are (i) occupation up to 
a visible line marked by monuments, fences or buildings and (ii) 
mutual acquiescence in the line as a boundary. 
Defendant filed motions in limine in May, 2003, and the 
court issued its ruling on^  September 22, 2003. The court ruled 
that the burden is on Plaintiffs, who now bear the burden of 
showing boundary by acquiescence and that the burden of proof is 
by the preponderance of the evidence. The court also ruled it 
was premature for the court to decide what Brown may testify to 
concerning specific statements. The court concluded that 
Defendant's recorded deed is relevant as Plaintiffs would not 
need to prove a boundary by acquiescence claim if Defendant's 
deed did not show that the property was his but the first and 
second prongs of the test remain and sufficiency of Plaintiffs' 
evidence in support of those prongs will be decided at trial. 
The court also determined that boundary by acquiescence claims 
may proceed without meeting the requirements of the statute of 
frauds and that the statute of frauds does not apply to boundary 
by acquiescence claims. The court also ruled UCA 78-12-7 relates 
to adverse possession and does not apply to boundary by 
acquiescence claims. The court refused to apply any presumption 
that applies to adverse possession to boundary by acquiescence. 
The court also refused to quiet title without trial. 
At the close of plaintiffs' case defendant moved for a 
directed verdict under URCP, RuLe 50. The court believes that 
when the trial is to the court the proper motion is under Rule 
41(b), a motion for a dismissal claiming plaintiff has shown no 
right to relief. The court took that matter under advisement and 
allowed defendant to present his evidence. 
The court heard evidence, received exhibits, heard argument 
of counsel, and is fully advised. 
LAW 
The law surrounding the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence 
is confusing. The issues are between two adversaries and each 
has interests that are worthwhile. On one side is the desirable 
feature of being able to turn to recorded instruments to 
determine property rights and boundaries. On the other side is 
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the also desirable principle of allowing the peace and good order 
of society to be served by leaving at rest possible disputes over 
boundaries where there has been a recognizable physical boundary 
accepted as such for a long time period. This case highlights 
those two worthy, competing interests between what appear to the 
court to be good and decent people. 
It is the policy of Utah law under the cases to apply the 
doctrine of boundary by acquiescence restrictively, though it is 
not unjust in some circumstances to require property owners to 
live with what they and their predecessors have long acquiesced 
in. 
For a court to quiet title in a parcel of property on the 
basis of boundary by acquiescence the party claiming title under 
the doctrine must establish (1) occupation up to a visible line 
marked by monuments, fences, or buildings, (ii) mutual 
acquiescence in the line as a boundary, (iii) for a long period 
of time, and (iv) by adjoining landowners. If the party claiming 
title under the doctrine fails to establish any one of the 
elements the boundary is defeated. The court, the Honorable 
Robert K. Hilderr has previously ruled that the final two 
elements have been established by undisputed testimony. To show 
mutual acquiescence plaintiffs must show both parties recognized 
and acknowledged a visible line and that the parties acknowledge 
the line as a demarcation between the properties. Both parties 
must have knowledge of the existence of a line as the boundary 
line. This element serves the useful and practical purpose where 
the parties are seemingly content to recognize a marked line as a 
practical boundary between them. When the parties acquiesce they 
are precluded from claiming the boundary line is not the true 
line. The landowner must recognize and treat an observable line 
such as a fence as the boundary dividing the properties. The 
acquiescence may be tacit or inferred from evidence. Even mere 
conversation between parties evidencing an ongoing dispute or an 
unwillingness by one to accept the line refutes the allegation of 
mutual acquiescence. The purpose of a fence is relevant and may 
be considered and may be determinative because both parties must 
acknowledge a particular line to be the dividing line. If the 
fence was not intended as a boundary there cannot be acquiescence 
in that fence as a boundary line. If a fence is built for 
livestock control or some other purpose and not as a boundary, it 
is not a boundary by acquiescence. Occupation of land up to a 
fence is not sufficient if the adverse owner does not acquiesce 
in the fence as a boundary. Evidence of knowledge of recorded 
deeds and instrument is not relevant in a boundary by 
acquiescence case. See Ault v. Holden, 44 P. 3d 781 (Utah 2002); 
Edgell v. Canning, 976 P.2d 1193 (Utah 1999); Wilkinson Family 
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Farm v. Babcock, 993 P.2d 229 (Utah App. 1999) ; Staker v. 
Ainsworth, 785 P. 2d 417 (Utah 1990). 
The court finds as follows: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Plaintiffs own land adjacent to defendant's land in 
Summit County. The parties land is called the Brown parcel and 
the Jorgensen parcel. The parcels are off what is called Brown's 
Canyon Road, Highway 196, between Highway 32 and Highway 40. 
2. Near the north border of the Jorgensen parcel is a fence 
which runs along what is now the disputed boundary in a 
Southeasterly direction, roughly along the Southern border of the 
Brown parcel. It runs from Highway 196, commonly known as Brown's 
Canyon Road, to a point approximately 580 feet from the road, 
then turns more easterly and runs toward the Weber River for 
approximately 1200 additional feet. See exhibit 10 for the most 
accurate showing of the property lines established by deed as 
well as the fence and ditch re Levant to this case. 
3. The fence was built by the father of plaintiff Thomas 
Brown, T. Edward Brown, in the mid 1940s, between 1943 and 1946, 
though there is some testimony it was built before that. 
Plaintiff helped his father build the fence, a cedar post and net 
and barbed wire fence that requires maintenance and repair on a 
regular basis. The fence has remained in the same basic position 
since that time, but plaintiffs have repaired and replaced some 
of it as recently as the mid-1990s. There has been ongoing wire 
replacement and the first approximately 580 feet from the road 
have been replaced completely in the mid 1990s, but the old cedar 
posts were left in place. The fence has been observable since its 
construction, though at various points it may have been leaning 
down or covered by sagebrush in places. Defendant testified 
contrary to that visibility, but the court, based on several 
other witnesses testimony, finds the fence has remained 
observable and open since the mid 1940s. Several neighbors and 
friends and relatives of plaintiffs so testified and some had 
been in the area and recall the fence from the 1940s. 
4 . The recorded deeds and plats show that the fence goes 
across the Jorgensen parcel and encloses approximately 6.94 acres 
of land that is shown on the deeds and plats and by certified 
surveys as belonging to Jorgensen. That area is the ''subject 
property." There is no question that the fence is on land deeded 
to and platted as belonging to Jorgensen since 1979. The 
recorded property lines are not disputed by plaintiffs. In 1979 
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Jorgensen and a partner, Rowell, acquired the Jorgensen parcel 
and the partnership dissolved in 198 6 and defendant acquired the 
parcel from the partnership and has owned it solely since 1986. 
The land was acquired, through a title company, from Tracy Land 
and Livestock (Tracy) who owned that land and much more in the 
area since the mid 1940s. 
5. T. Edward Brown died in 1951 and plaintiffs' family took 
over the land and have used it to graze cattle and grow hay and 
other crops since 1951. Plaintiffs took title in some of that 
property, approximately 17 acres, in 1971, and that property is 
now known herein as the Brown parcel. He built a house on a 
portion of the approximately 17 acre parcel deeded to him. The 
fence was always considered by plaintiff to be the boundary line 
and plaintiff believed fully that the fence was the property line 
to his property and has believed that since the fence was built, 
even before plaintiff took title to his 17 acre parcel in 1971. 
Before building the house, plaintiffs commissioned a survey which 
was done by metes and bounds, performed by Bush and Gudgell. 
That document shows in fact the same as the recorded instruments, 
before and after 1971, that in fact the property line was not the 
fence line. Plaintiff was legally aware of that metes and bounds 
survey but did not understand it showed a property line different 
from the fence line constructed by his father in the 1940s. His 
subjective intent and belief, which the court finds was not 
unreasonable, was that the fence erected by his father was his 
property line. 
6. As shown more fully on exhibit 10, the fence line is up 
hill from plaintiff's true property line. Defendant's property, 
where it adjoins plaintiffs' property, is largely barren and 
hilly and mostly sagebrush. Below that fence plaintiff and his 
family have used the property to graze cattle and sheep. There 
is an irrigation ditch that plaintiff has maintained and improved 
which is below, on the downhill side of, the fence. Plaintiff has 
also caused some of that ditch to be covered by constructing 
culverts. Below that ditch there is a drop off toward the 
plaintiff property. The fence runs from the Brown's Canyon road 
up the hill, southeasterly, and then toward the river. At about 
580 feet, it turns more easterly, toward the Weber River. No one, 
neither defendant nor his predecessors, have attempted to use or 
occupy the property below the fence line. The fence runs 
approximately 1900 feet, or .3 of a mile, and if considered as 
belonging to plaintiff, adds property consisting of 6.94 acres to 
plaintiff's 17 acre parcel. At the road, the fence is 
approximately 167 feet from the true property line, that distance 
expands to approximately 250 feet approximately 500 feet from the 
road, and it then decreased to approximately 69 feet at the far 
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south end. It is thus a "strip" of property somewhat irregular 
but averaging perhaps 175 feet wide and it is approximately 1900 
feet in length. That 6.94 acres is the disputed property. An 
irrigation ditch is in the strip, and that ditch originates at 
the river and flows northward, obviously downhill, toward the 
road and then under the road. 
7. On or about July 1, 1999, defendant wrote a note to 
plaintiffs telling them they had built a fence on defendant's 
land and it should be removed. Since at least that time the 
boundary line has been in dispute. Plaintiff immediately 
contacted defendant and they attempted to resolve the issue but 
were not able to do so. Plaintiff commissioned a survey shortly 
after that contact. That informal survey is consistent with the 
1971 metes and bounds survey that was accomplished so plaintiffs 
could build their home. Plaintiff was originally told in 1994 
that in fact the true property line probably ran through his 
home, but that was in error and the true line, as shown on 
Exhibit 10, is west of plaintiff's home. Plaintiffs have refused 
to remove the fence and filed this action to quiet title 
asserting the disputed land is owned by them under the doctrine 
of boundary by acquiescence. 
8. Defendant bought 195 acres in 1979 as an investment. He 
inspected the property and observed fence posts but the court 
finds the fence was visible. Defendant at that time was not 
aware by survey of the exact and true boundary line but he 
assumed the line was below the fence and irrigation ditch and 
utilized what he believed was a "road" on his property just below 
the irrigation ditch and envisioned that would be the access to 
his property. In fact the court finds it was not a "road" but 
was used to work along the irrigation ditch. It could be 
accessed from Brown's Canyon road but a fence and gate from 
Brown's property ran to the disputed fence approximately 500 feet 
from the road as shown on exhibit 10. 
9. The predecessors of defendant ran livestock on the land. 
There is no evidence Tracy ever saw the fence or knew of its 
existence. There was no evidence adduced whatever that Tracy 
used or occupied the land on the downhill side of the fence. 
10. Defendant took surveyors and potential buyers along that 
area of the ditch but the court finds that was not occupation of 
the land. 
11. Defendant, in anticipation of possible buyers of some of 
his land, commissioned a survey in 1994, and that survey showed 
that the true line was not the fence line. Defendant always 
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believed the true line was not the fence, which he claims he did 
not even see except for a few old leaning cedar posts, but that 
the boundary line was downhill by the ditch and by the Brown home 
where it was marked with a flag when defendant first inspected 
it. The survey he commissioned in 1994 showed he was correct 
about the true boundary line, that it was not the fence line. 
The surveys are consistent with all the recorded instruments and 
show the true boundaries as shown on Exhibit 10. That survey was 
done by one France, who talked with plaintiff about the results 
of that survey, along with the real estate broker McPhie. France 
told plaintiff that plaintiff's house was probably partly on the 
Jorgensen property. That was incorrect, but plaintiff was told 
that. 
12. Plaintiff erected a wooden rail fence along the Brown's 
Canyon Road, to replace a wire fence across the front of his 
property, but ran it across the "road" or disputed approximate 
167 feet to the disputed fence in the late 1990s. Plaintiff does 
not call that area by the Bitch, the disputed area, a xxroad" but 
the court finds vehicles could drive onto it before the wooden 
rail fence was installed, though it was not intended as a road. 
ISSUES 
Here, as found, each party operated in good faith. In 
actual fact the true boundary line was as shown on the recorded 
records, deeds and plats. There was a 1971 survey that showed 
the fence was NOT the boundary line, but that was not understood 
by plaintiff. Thus, the issue becomes difficult for the court. 
That is especially so since two recent appellate court decisions 
are somewhat in conflict. There are recorded documents and 
surveys showing actual boundary lines. The parties are 
constructively charged with that knowledge, thus each party knew 
the boundary line and there was no legal uncertainty though there 
was practical uncertainty by plaintiff. Defendant then did 
nothing, by word or deed, to object to a visible fence. The 
issue thus becomes whether that inaction as to a fence, which was 
erected for a purpose not shown by the evidence, but by inference 
was erected not to establish a boundary line but for some other 
purpose, amounts to mutual acquiescence in that fence as a 
boundary. 
Based on the above findings and discussion, the court makes 
the following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
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1. Plaintiffs had constructive knowledge of the true 
property line since they commissioned a survey in 1971. Prior 
deeds and documents showed the true boundary line as well. Those 
instruments showed that the true property line, according to 
deeds and plats and surveys, was not the fence line constructed 
by plaintiff's father. Plaintiff believed, however, that the 
fence line was the demarcation of the property line. 
2. Defendant is the record title owner of the disputed land. 
He also had constructive knowledge of the true property line at 
least since 1994 when he commissioned a survey of his property. 
He had constructive knowledge since 197 9 when he obtained a deed 
with the property description. That 1994 survey showed the 
property line not to be where the fence was but the true property 
line was according to the deeds and plats of record. 
3. Plaintiff has operated under the assumption that the 
fence constructed in the 1940s by his father was in fact the 
property line. 
4. The fence has been open and notorious and visible since 
the 1940s. It has on occasion been in disrepair but has been an 
observable fence since that time. 
5. Plaintiff used and occupied the land as if it were his 
and was open and notorious about that use. The fence has served 
as an observable and open boundary for a long period of time 
between two adjoining land owners. The topography and terrain 
made the fence placement a practical place to erect a fence as it 
would keep cattle and sheep off of the irrigation ditch and the 
lower drop off and off of what was in the 1940s pasture land, 
until the home was built in 1971. Given the slope and the 
irrigation ditch and the terrain in the area the court infers and 
concludes that the purpose of the fence was to contain livestock 
and keep grazing livestock of the predecessor owner from the 
Brown property. The fence was not intended as a boundary line 
demarcating the property. There has been occupation of the land 
by plaintiffs up to the fence. There has been no occupation by 
defendant or his predecessors below or east of that fence. 
Defendant's occupation, and that of his predecessors, has been 
only up to that disputed fence. 
6. There was no mutual acquiescence in the open boundary 
line of the fence. This area is rural and defendant visited only 
on occasion as he bought the land for investment purposes. He 
purchased 195 acres and had possible plans to subdivide the area. 
There was no acquiescence in the fence as a boundary. Defendant 
did not take any action to oust plaintiff and remained silent as 
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relates to plaintiff until 1999. However, defendant did 
commission a survey in 1994. To the court that indicates a lack 
of acquiescence. If acquiescence is, in the words of Ault v. 
Holden, "where adjoining landowners are seemingly content to 
recognize a marked line or monument not on the true line as the 
practical boundary between them," then the hiring of a survey to 
the court conveys the opposite of acquiescence. If defendant 
believed and acquiesced in the notion that the fence was the 
boundary, he would not have commissioned a survey in this rural 
area. That act, though not conveyed directly to plaintiff, shows 
a lack of acquiescence. That act showed an unwillingness to 
accept the fence as the property line. In fact, however, even if 
the surveyor, Wallace France, was not an agent of defendant, that 
fact of obtaining the survey was conveyed to plaintiff. Moreover, 
the court concludes it need not have been conveyed to the 
opposing landowner to evidence a lack of acquiescence, or 
unwillingness to accept the fence as a boundary line. 
Plaintiffs have to prove mutual acquiescence by a preponderance 
of the evidence. Plaintiff argued that unless defendant conveyed 
that lack of acquiescence to plaintiff there was acquiescence. 
The court disagrees. While most cases evidently show a dispute by 
a direct communication with the opposing landowner, the court 
concludes that any actions that show an unwillingness to 
acknowledge the fence as a boundary are sufficient to defeat the 
doctrine. The acquiescence includes plaintiff demonstrating that 
both parties "recognized and acknowledged" a visible line. Ault 
v. Holden, 44 P. 3d at 13. Defendant's actions in commissioning a 
survey were inconsistent with an "acknowledgment" that the fence 
was the property line. There seems to be no good reason that the 
lack of acknowledgment is only effective if conveyed to the 
opposing landowner. The doctrine requires that there be an 
actual acknowledgment, and that the parties treat the fence as a 
common boundary between the properties. Telling others that the 
fence is not the boundary, or hiring a surveyor, seems to the 
court to defeat the idea that there is an acknowledgment in a 
boundary line. As mentioned, moreover, here plaintiff was aware 
in 1994 there was a dispute when France and McPhie talked to him 
about the property line being other than at the disputed fence 
line. 
Further, the seeming inaction of defendant was not shown to 
be a tacit approval of the fence as boundary line. The inaction 
of defendant and his predecessors was acquiescence in the fence 
line for some purpose, but plaintiff has not shown it was an 
acquiescence in the fence line as a boundary line. 
The court believes plaintiff's arguments seek to m effect 
reduce the elements of boundary by acquiescence from four to 
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three. Simple occupation of land, up to a visible fence or 
boundary, without more, is not acquiescence. Though acquiescence 
may be tacit, it must be more than has been shown here by 
plaintiff. 
As to the predecessor acquiescing, the court rejects 
plaintiff's arguments in that regard. First, plaintiff must show 
acquiescence, which requires a showing that the other landowner, 
defendant's predecessor Tracy, "recognized and acknowledged" the 
visible line. There may be an inference that Tracy, running 
livestock, saw the fence, but the court concludes that is 
insufficient to show Tracy even saw ("recognized") the fence, let 
alone acknowledged it as a boundary line. The four elements do 
not overlap. Failure to occupy by Tracy, coupled with occupation 
by plaintiff, does not amount to acknowledgment the fence is a 
boundary. 
7. The boundary by acquiescence elements have not been met. 
There has been occupation of the land by plaintiffs up to a 
visible mark (fence) for a long period of time, over 20 years, by 
adjoining land owners, but plaintiffs have not shown by a 
preponderance of the evidence that there was mutual acquiescence 
by the parties in that fence as the boundary line. Defendant 
failed to oust plaintiff, but did not agree that the fence was 
the boundary. Moreover, given the court's conclusion about the 
action of defendant in 1994 amounting to a dispute because of a 
failure to acknowledge the fence as a line, there has not even 
been an undisputed period of 20 years since defendant's 
ownership. 
The court indicated the recent cases are confusing. In 
Wilkinson, a Court of Appeals decision, the court said 
specifically that knowledge of the true boundary is not 
irrelevant. However, that court then quoted language from a case 
that has in effect been overruled because it considered the 
objective uncertainty element aad that has now been eliminated as 
an element of the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence. The Utah 
Supreme Court said after Wilkinson in Ault that a landowner must 
recognize and treat an observabLe line as the boundary, 
''regardless of whether the^  landowner knows where the actual 
boundary lies or whether the boundary is uncertain." To this 
court that means that knowledge of the actual or true boundary is 
not relevant. Here, there was never any legal uncertainty as to 
the true boundary line but there was actual uncertainty. The 
court concludes that such facts as these do not allow the 
doctrine of boundary by acquiescence to grant an interest in 
property. The knowledge of the parties as to the true boundary 
lines is not relevant under Ault since the elimination of the 
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objective uncertainty element. 
The appearances of this area, the terrain, and the nature of 
the land and its uses by the parties do not allow a resident to 
obtain land by merely constructing a fence and then merely 
because the absentee landowner does nothing to have the fence 
removed claim title to the area up to the fence. The court has 
no question that plaintiffs predecessors did not intend to 
"appropriate" the land in this way, nor is there any evidence the 
fence was erected for any improper purpose. The clear inference 
is that the fence was erected to contain livestock and protect a 
ditch, and not to establish a boundary line. The plaintiffs7 
predecessors' record deeds also showed the actual boundary lines 
of the properties. Plaintiff has not shown that defendant or his 
predecessors mutually acquiesced for 20 years in this fence as a 
property line. 
8. The statute of frauds does not apply in this case. The 
statute of frauds, UCA 25-5-1, allows creation of an interest in 
land by "operation of law." The doctrine of boundary by 
acquiescence is the operation of law. If plaintiff had prevailed 
in showing all elements of that doctrine an interest in land 
could be acquired by operation of law without a writing. 
Accordingly, the motion to dismiss is denied. The court 
orders that quiet title be awarded to defendant as in the 
recorded instruments. 
Defendant is to prepare an order in compliance with URCP, 
Rule 7(f) setting forth this ruling. 
DATED this / day 
BRUCE C. LUBECK \*°?S* *.-*. 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE ^ ^2out$ ^ 
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SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 8 4 1 4 7 
SPECIAL V/ARKANTY DEED J-3500-A-1 
{CORPORATE FOR\f> 
UTAH TITLE AND ABSTRACT COMPANY,'InMee, a corporntion oifjanizcd and exiting 
under the laws- of the State of Utah, with its principal office at S.ilr Lake City, of County of 
Salt Lake, State of Utah, grantor, hereby CONVEYS AM) WAUR \NTS ngairM all churning 
by, through or under it to 
DEAN W. ROWELL, a s i n g l e m a n , a s t o a n u n d i v i d e d o n e - h a l f i n t e r e s t , and LLC 
JORGENSEto, a s i n g l e n a n , a s t o an u n d i v i d e d o n e - h a l f i n t e r e s t g r a n t e e 
of S a l t Lake C i t y , C o u n t y o f S a l t L a k e , S t a t e o f Utah 
for t h e s u m of T E N D O L L A R S a n d o t h e r good a n d vnhi ible c o n s i d e r a t i o n s 
the following d e s c r i b e d t r a c t of l and in Sunn i t 
S t a t e of U t a h 
Count v, 
s SEF EXHIBIT "A" MTACHEP hEREIO AND BY 1\ f s *;<- TRrN'CE M*DC \ PART I T T 0 " 
\ ^] 1 THIS WARRANTY DEED I S BEING RE-RECORDED TO CORRECT THE LEGAL DESCRIPTION. 
; \ ! 
01 
ci O ~Z 
SL'UECt TO c a ^ o n c p t b , r e b t r u t t o i s and n ; 1 ^ of way a p p e a r i n g c f r t c u c d 
o r e n t o r c o a o l e i n l aw a r d e q u i t v . 
SUBJECT t o che r i g h t of Sirur i t Cc»mt \ t e r ' M s « . c s e t h e ca^ ^ s e s s n e n c on 
s a i d p r o p e r t y i n a c c o r d a n c e v L tli Sec-> V ^ - 3 - 8 6 103 UCA 1933 a s d i s c l o s e d 
b> c e r e a l . ' A n n u a l \ p p l i c a t i o n f< r A s s t ^ n . i c a r d T a x a t i o n of A g r i c u l t u r a l 
L i n o , 1Q69 F a i r l i n d A s ^ o s s i r e n t A a . 
U N H I D 10 S l k M C : lUiP'Tb 0 \ i Y . 
7 ht of f ic t / s \\}]U s '^n t h i s deed h e n h\ (trtifx th a t h i s deed rnd t h e trintfcr npn^vnttd 
t h t t t ' n \ 1^  <K\\\ u u h n , u l u n i l i r a n MIIUIK n d u l \ , i d ' > p t < d h ) t h e bo ird of d u c c t o i > of t h e 
; , ' iantoi a t a lawful r u t - t i m r clulv held a n d . i t t ' nded hv 1 q u o r u m 
In w i tnes s w h e u u f , t h e g r a n t o r h a s u e . s c d i ts (.orp >ri te n a m e to b e h^ reun* if.%v~ *_ 
















UTAH TfTLK AND \B^1 llACT COMPANY, Trustee 
? 4-19-79 -- 11-35- r -„ fi/i -J f r\ r- % - ^ 
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 » ^ ^h<> l>« IM„ h\ m e dui> s w o r n , did s a y t h a t h e 
s t f < , s l n *T ot i n \ H i n i X \ M D A B S T R A C T C O M P A N Y , 
111
 ti ( f 1 c (» rpor i tmn uui t h i t said i n s t m m < n t wis- s j c r n u j j n beha l f of sa id c o r p o r a t i o n b y 
nil hi)~it\ of i ts b \ I n v
 ( o I h \ i re^nlut i ( j ) <>j ts bo\rd of di f ac to r s ) ard sa id LD '^ARD 5 
MK « i\S at l m \ ledges to rr e t h a t sa id c o r p o r a t i o n 
( 1 v \\U d ilu >^ \ni( / i 
1
 !\ ( Of anjs-}^ t ) \ p T i s 
I a 1 t \ 20 1 ) 
N o t n r v P u b l i c 
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UZuh Isiie and Abstract Company 
A-b-r 39^3373 
BIT "A" 
Said property being „..catcd in Section 15, Township.1 South, Ra 5. .E;i: 
/ PARCEL 1: Lot 72, mure particuUrly described HH follows:,, 
BEGINNING at a point that is due South 3H97.490 feet and due Kast 
J 9,393.776 feet from Che Northwest Corner of Section 10, Township 
1 South, Range 5 East, Salt Lake rlasc £ Meridian, Summit County, 
Utah. 
(said Northwest Corner bearing North l ' O f W West from Southwest 
Corner and being the basis of bearing for this description). 
oc •/» 
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T h e n c e : 
/ 
North 35s30f West 1641.209 feet to .i point on the Southerly 
iight-of-uay line of State Highway 196; 
Xorth 43°42; Hast along said right -of-way line 1101.410 feet 
to a point of tendency with a 1095.916 foot radius curve; 
Northeasterly along the arc of said curve to the right through 
a central angle of 40°55,3r'. » distance of 837.778 feet to a 
point on the West line of the Southeast 1/u. of Northeastl/4 of 
Section 15, Township 1 South, Eaneo 5 F.ast, Salt Lake Sasc & 
Meridian; 
leaving said r*.-,ht-of-uay lines 2° 28'3 3" East along said West 
line to the Southeast Corner of the Southwest Quarter of the 
Northeast Quarter of said Section 13; 
Hast along ihe South line of the Southeast Quarter of the North-
east Quarter of ?*-*U Section 13 t o the Northeast Corner of the 
Southeast 1/4 of said Section J 5; 
South 2°30T40" East along the East line of said Southeast 1/4 
1297.974 feet; 
Thencei South 80° West 1922.645 feel, to the point of i'.EGI NNINC. 
Access from State Highway 19f'. 
EXCKl'TINC therefrom the following described parcels: 
iiK^ l.NNl NC at the Northeast Corner of the" Southeast Quarter of Section 15, 
Tov:i.M;ip 1 South, Range 3 East, Salt Lake Ma*;*- f, Meridian, running thence 
West 211 feet; thence Southeasterly 703 feet, more or less, to a point on 
•the Section line 671 feet South of the place of beginning; thence North 
671 feet to the place of BEGINNING. 
EXCEPTING therefrom that portion of the io1]owi m; described parcel lying 
within so id tract. 
A tract situated in the Southwest Quarter of the Northeast Quarter of Section 
15,.Township 1 South, Range 5 East, Sale Like Base & -Meridian, described cs 
follows: BECIN.\" INC at the Northeast Comer of r he Southwest Quarter of the 
Northeast Quarter of said Section 15, arid running thence South 11.00 chains: 
thence North 4?D20r West 16.5 chains; thence East 12.42 chains to the place 
of BEGINNING. 
/'PARCEL 2: BEGINNING :j L ..he Southeast Corner v\' Section 15, Township 1 
South, Range 5 East, >„it Luke Base & Meridian, and running thence North 
:«lonj- the East line of said Section 15t to a point which Is South 2°j0,L0'f 
East along the East line of said Section 13, 1297.974 feet from th- North-
east Corner of the Southeast Quarter of said Section 13, and running thence 
South 86° West 1922.645 feet' thence South 3/.°12'38M Vest 1701.301 feet; 
thence North 85°55'57" West 1127.841 feet; thence South 5°05'32" West 292.641 
feet, ::iore or less, to the South line of said Section 13; thence East along 
the South lino of said Section 13, 4,507.791 feet :o the point of BEGINNING. 
PARCEL 3: BEGINNING 4.7 chains West of the East Quarter Section Corner of said 
Section 15; thence West 15.3 chains; thence North 9.5 chains; thence South 58° 
10f East 13.02 chains, moire or less, to the place of BEGINNING. 
ALL PARCELS LIMITED TO SURFACE RIGHTS ONLY. ^ 
aiyers subject to the right of Sunlit County zo reassess the tax assessment on said <f-
• loperty-in accordance with Sees, 59-5-o6 103 VCA i953 as disclosed by certain Annuel ^Q 
••'plication for Assessment and Taxation c( Agricultural Land 1969. UJ^gy 
is s 
Stibject to the Covenants and Conditions as set forth in that certain WaLranty tt ^ 
Deed dated April 3rd, 1978, by and between TRACY LAND AND LIVESTOCK COMPANY, ^ T
 K>v 
Grantor, and UTAH TITLE AND ABSTRACT COMPANY, TRUSTEE, Grantee, recorded ^ 
April 5th, 1979, in Rook M 130, at Pages 682-685, as Entry No. 154706, of 
Official Records of Summit County, Utah, and recorded April 6th, 1979, in 
Book .124, at Pages 589-592, as Er.c .y No.' 116016, of Official Records of (T> 
Wasatch Com , Utah. ^ 
